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Abstract
Recent research with face-to-face groups found that a measure of general group
effectiveness (called ‘‘collective intelligence’’) predicted a group’s performance on a
wide range of different tasks. The same research also found that collective
intelligence was correlated with the individual group members’ ability to reason
about the mental states of others (an ability called ‘‘Theory of Mind’’ or ‘‘ToM’’).
Since ToM was measured in this work by a test that requires participants to ‘‘read’’
the mental states of others from looking at their eyes (the ‘‘Reading the Mind in the
Eyes’’ test), it is uncertain whether the same results would emerge in online groups
where these visual cues are not available. Here we find that: (1) a collective
intelligence factor characterizes group performance approximately as well for online
groups as for face-to-face groups; and (2) surprisingly, the ToM measure is equally
predictive of collective intelligence in both face-to-face and online groups, even
though the online groups communicate only via text and never see each other at all.
This provides strong evidence that ToM abilities are just as important to group
performance in online environments with limited nonverbal cues as they are face-
to-face. It also suggests that the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test measures a
deeper, domain-independent aspect of social reasoning, not merely the ability to
recognize facial expressions of mental states.
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Introduction
A growing body of research has been focused on the importance of individuals’
ability to make inferences about others’ mental states, termed ‘‘theory of mind’’
(ToM) or ‘‘mentalizing’’ [1–5]. A common assumption in much of this research is
that people with greater ToM abilities will be more competent at various kinds of
social interaction. But only a few studies have tested this in limited ways with
children [6–8], and fewer still have tested it with adults [9–11].
One exception is a recent study by Woolley et al. [11], which found that groups
of adults with higher average ToM scores also had significantly higher ‘‘collective
intelligence,’’ as measured by the group’s ability to perform well across a wide
range of different group tasks. Indeed, average ToM scores were the only
significant predictor of collective intelligence in a regression that included other
group composition and process variables.
However, it is unknown how rich interpersonal cues need to be in order for
collective intelligence to emerge at all, or for individual members to engage in the
mentalizing necessary to facilitate social interaction. Essentially all of the studies
exploring the relationship between ToM and effective social interaction, including
the Woolley et al. [11] study, have been conducted using face-to-face interactions.
At the same time, an increasing proportion of social interactions today take place
in online environments. According to the Pew Research Center, 73% of adults
regularly use social networking sites of some kind, and 54% of American teenagers
text their friends at least once a day, but only 33% talk to their friends face-to-face
on a daily basis [12]. In addition to our social relationships, we increasingly work
in online teams and rely on the collective intelligence of other groups whose
collaboration is largely online [13, 14]. Online, many of the interpersonal cues that
are important in face-to-face interactions (such as reading facial expressions and
body language, or judging tone of voice) are not available, potentially impairing
our ability to communicate effectively [15–17].
With this reduced communication bandwidth, it is to be expected that the
ability to reason about the mental states of other group members should be
impaired. This could reduce the predictive value of ToM for group performance
in environments lacking in interpersonal cues; that is, ToM skills could be
expected to play a much smaller role in online environments. On the other hand,
one might also argue that ToM-related ability should be even more important in
online interaction because the cues provided are so subtle that a lot of ‘‘reading
between the lines’’ is necessary.
To help determine which of these views is correct, we compare the importance
of ToM skills for predicting group performance in face-to-face and online groups.
In so doing, we also test a new, web-based measure of collective intelligence that
enables its measurement in both settings, allowing us to examine whether a
collective intelligence emerges in online groups, and to replicate and extend
previous findings [11].
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Collective Intelligence in Groups
Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that a single statistical factor–often
called ‘‘general intelligence’’ or ‘‘g’’– emerges from the correlations among how
well different people do a wide variety of different cognitive tasks (e.g., [18, 19]).
This single factor can then be used to differentiate the characteristic performance
levels of different individuals and to predict which individuals are likely to
perform well on other tasks in the future.
In recent studies, Woolley et al [11] used the same statistical techniques used in
individual intelligence research to see whether a similar collective intelligence
factor exists for groups. In other words, they tried to determine the degree to
which some groups are characteristically ‘‘smarter’’ than others across a wide
range of tasks. To do this, they first gave different groups a variety of tasks that
required qualitatively different collaboration processes [20, 21]. Then they used
factor analysis to determine whether there was a single factor for a group–as there
is for an individual–that predicts the group’s performance on all the different
tasks.
They found that the first factor accounted for 43% of the variance in
performance on all the different tasks. This is consistent with the 30–50% of
variance typically explained by the first factor in a battery of individual cognitive
tasks [18]. In individuals, this factor is called ‘‘intelligence’’ or ‘‘g.’’ For groups,
Woolley et al. [11] called it ‘‘collective intelligence’’ or ‘‘c,’’ and it is a measure of
the general effectiveness of a group on a wide range of tasks. The c factor was also
shown to predict how well the groups performed more complex tasks at a later
time, above and beyond the predictive ability of the average individual intelligence
of group members.
They also found several factors that were significant predictors of c. First, the
average and maximum intelligence of individual group members were correlated
with c, but only moderately so. In other words, having a lot of smart people in a
group did not necessarily make a smart group. Second, there was a significant
correlation between c and the average ToM scores of group members, as measured
by the ‘‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’’ test [22]. Third, c was negatively correlated
with the variance in the number of speaking turns by group members. In other
words, groups where a few people dominated the conversation were less
collectively intelligent than those with a more equal distribution of conversational
turn taking. Finally, c was significantly correlated with the proportion of females
in the group, with groups having more females being more collectively intelligent.
In addition, the researchers found that the effects of proportion of females were
largely mediated by ToM scores since, consistent with previous research, women
in the sample scored better on this measure than men. In a regression analysis
including proportion of women, ToM scores, and conversational turn-taking,
ToM scores remained the only significant predictor of collective intelligence.
Taken together, this research on collective intelligence suggests that the ToM
abilities of group members play a large role facilitating group social interaction.
What the existing research does not tell us is the degree to which these findings
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would apply in situations with highly impoverished communication channels
such as many online environments. We do not even know, for instance, whether a
single collective intelligence factor will emerge in online groups with limited
communication, nor whether mentalizing ability will play as much of a role in
that setting, due to the constraints on communication ability and the lack of
interpersonal cues.
On the one hand, for example, previous research on collaboration in teams has
found that the effect of using online tools for group tasks depends strongly on the
type of tasks being performed [23–25]. If this effect dominates, we may see more
variance in how the same group performs different tasks, and the factor analysis
might result in several approximately equal factors for different types of tasks
rather than a single dominant collective intelligence factor. On the other hand, if
the most important determinants of group performance are the abilities of the
members to work together, then we would expect a single important factor to
emerge in online groups as was true with those working face-to-face.
Theory of Mind and Emotional Intelligence
As mentioned previously, a large and growing body of research has focused on the
importance of individuals’ ability to make inferences about others’ mental states,
termed ‘‘theory of mind’’ (ToM), ‘‘mentalizing’’ [1–5], or, more recently, ‘‘mind
reading’’ [26]. Such abilities are thought to be distinctly human, and fundamental
to our ability to function in social settings. Indeed, severe impairment in ToM is a
core characteristic of the developmental disorder of autism [2, 22].
Theory of mind is viewed by some as a subset of a broader array of skills and
abilities associated with the more general concept of emotional intelligence (i.e.,
[27]). A growing body of work demonstrates the importance of emotional
intelligence and related abilities to team performance [28–30]. Thus its
connection with collective intelligence is consistent with existing work
demonstrating the importance of the abilities of group members to recognize one
another’s nonverbal emotional expression for group effectiveness [31, 32]. The
broader construct of emotional intelligence not only encompasses social
awareness (an ability closely associated with theory of mind) but also self-
awareness, self-management, and relationship management [33]. Emotional
intelligence has been empirically demonstrated to operate statistically as a second-
stratum factor of cognitive ability, marking the expression of intelligence in the
emotion domain [34]. However, little consensus exists regarding the best ways to
measure the self-awareness and relationship management components of
emotional intelligence, and when they are measured in reliable ways they tend to
be highly correlated with one another [35, 36]. Theory of mind is, thus, among the
small group of abilities within the broad category of emotional intelligence that
can be most reliably measured. However, as discussed above, it remains unknown
how much interpersonal information is needed for mentalizing to occur, or for
such abilities to be relevant to facilitating social interaction. For instance, almost
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all previous studies of ToM and social interaction were conducted in settings
permitting full face-to-face or verbal interaction [6–11]. Thus, the goal of this
research is to explore the degree to which a collective intelligence factor arises even
in temporary, online groups with highly constrained communication, and the
degree to which ToM ability plays a role in facilitating collective intelligence in
these settings.
Method
A total of 272 participants were recruited from the general population via Internet
advertisements in the Boston area and were invited to the laboratory and
randomly assigned to a four-person team for a ninety-minute session. The
Institutional Review Board at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has
reviewed and approved the study under COUHES protocol number 0801002578.
The study was carried out in accordance with the declaration of Helsinki. All
participants were paid for their participation and their written informed consent
was obtained before the start of the session. Fifty-two percent of the participants
were male.
We determined a priori that a minimum of 60 groups were needed to achieve at
least 80% power to detect a medium to strong effect size, which we expected based
on previous research [11]. During the time period that the facilities and
participants were available to conduct the study, we were able to recruit enough
participants for 68 groups. Each of the 68 groups was randomly assigned to one of
two conditions: face-to-face or online. All participants were seated in front of
personal laptop computers and worked with their group members in a shared
online system to complete the tasks described below. Each face-to-face group was
seated in a private room around a small table and was allowed to communicate
freely. Members in the online groups were randomly seated in a large room with
members of other groups. They did not know who else was in their group, and
they only communicated with their group members via text chat in the shared
online system. The entire group task battery was completed in just under an hour.
Then all subjects completed individual tests, including the ‘‘Reading the Mind in
the Eyes’’ (RME) test and individual personality scales.
Measure of collective intelligence
Our measure of collective intelligence was an online (and significantly expanded)
version of the approach used by Woolley et al [11]. The shared online system used
to administer the test battery moved the group members through the tasks
together, ensuring that all members of a group worked on the same tasks at the
same time. Each task had a fixed duration of between 2 and 10 minutes, after
which the next task would automatically begin. The entire battery took
64 minutes for a group to complete. Fig. 1 shows how a sample task in the test
battery appeared on the screens of team members.
Theory of Mind Predicts Collective Intelligence
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0115212 December 16, 2014 5 / 16
Our goal in task selection was to include a comprehensive sample of many
different kinds of tasks that groups do. Accordingly, our initial selection was based
on established taxonomies of team tasks [20, 21] and on the tasks used in prior
studies of collective intelligence [11].
Generating tasks required the generation of new information and ideas. These
included three brainstorming tasks (such as generating uses for a brick).
Choosing tasks required choosing among specified alternatives in two ways. In
‘‘intellective’’ tasks there was an objectively correct answer. These included an 18-
item subset of the Raven’s Advanced Progressive Matrices test (a nonverbal test of
abstract reasoning), a Sudoku puzzle task, a word unscrambling task, and a task of
estimating quantities based on pictures. In ‘‘judgment’’ tasks, choosing among the
alternatives was based on subjective judgments. These included predicting how a
larger group of Americans would rate a series of slogans and images for quality on
a ten-point scale.
Executing tasks required coordinated psychomotor performance across group
members. These included typing tasks in which the group had to accurately
transcribe into a shared online document as much as possible of a nonfiction text
passage or a long list of numbers.
We also added two additional categories to reflect many other types of tasks
important in the study of cognitive psychology, artificial intelligence, and groups
(e.g., [37, 38, 39]).
Remembering tasks required groups to collectively store and retrieve informa-
tion, similar to those evaluated in work on transactive memory systems [40, 41].
These included two memory tasks that tested memory for features from a video or
a complex image.
Fig. 1. A screenshot of a group solving a Sudoku task. The right-hand chat window allows the group to
communicate. The middle task panel is where the group enters its answers. The left-hand instructions panel
contains instructions and other stimulus materials for the task.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115212.g001
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Sensing tasks required groups to collectively detect patterns in an otherwise
noisy environment. These included two detection tasks that presented grids of
words or images in which the groups had to answer questions about the elements,
e.g. finding the most frequent object.
We included at least one task from each category, as well as ‘‘verbal’’ and
‘‘nonverbal’’ variants of each category of tasks (see full descriptions of the tasks
and additional descriptive statistics in the following Supplementary Materials
available online: Task Descriptions; Tables S2, S3, S4a, and S4b in S1 Text).
Following Woolley et al. [11], we performed a factor analysis on all the groups’
scores on all the tasks. We call the first factor that emerges from this analysis the
groups’ collective intelligence. Mathematically, scores on this collective intelligence
factor represent weighted averages of the different task scores, with the weights
derived from the correlations between the tasks and the first factor. Collective
intelligence scores determined in this way have been shown to be strong predictors
of the general effectiveness of a group on a range of more complex tasks [11].
Group communication measures
We measured communication differently for face-to-face groups and online
groups. For the face-to-face groups, we recorded each member’s spoken
communication with individual microphones. Then we ran an automated script
on these four audio tracks to determine who, if anyone, was speaking at each
point in time. The total amount of communication was the total amount of time
during which anyone was speaking. We also calculated the distribution of
communication as the standard deviation in the amount of speaking time for
different group members. For online groups, we calculated the total amount of
communication as the total number of words in the online chat transcripts. We
also calculated the distribution of communication as the standard deviation in the
number of words chatted by different group members.
Group member work contribution
Several of the tasks required groups to work together in a synchronized text
editing environment (similar to that of Google Docs). For these tasks, we recorded
how much text each member contributed to the final product and calculated the
standard deviation of the members’ contributions.
Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME)
All participants completed the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test [22]. The test
consists of 36 images of only the eyes of individuals, and participants are asked to
choose among four possible mental states to describe the person whose eyes are
pictured. The options are all complex mental states (e.g., shame, guilt, curiosity,
desire) rather than simple emotions (e.g., happiness, anger). Our sample was
similar in mean and variability on this test to the original general population
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sample in Baron-Cohen et al. [22] (ours: M524.85, SD55.24; original: M526.2,
SD53.6). Individual scores of the group members were averaged for each group.
Individual Personality Traits
Participants completed a Five Factor Personality Inventory [42], one of the most
widely used personality tests. This test measures the five primary dimensions of
adult personality: Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to
Experience, and Neuroticism. Sixty items are responded to on a 1 to 5 scale; the
mean for each scale was calculated for each participant. These scales were entered
into a factor analysis to calculate a general factor of personality for each
participant and aggregated to the group level, which was analyzed for its
relationship with collective intelligence and RME [43].
Results
First, replicating the results from Woolley et al. [11] using a new task battery and
manipulating team member co-location, we found that the first factor in the
factor analysis of group scores explained 49% of the variance in face-to-face and
41% in online groups, and the second factor explained less than half this amount
(see Fig. 2). This provides additional support for the basic result from prior
research that there is a single dominant collective intelligence factor for human
groups, and that the existence of collective intelligence does not depend on groups
being able to communicate face to face, but generalizes to online groups who
communicate only by text. It also strengthens the evidence for collective
intelligence by generalizing the finding from the test batteries used by Woolley et
al. to the new battery developed here.
Surprisingly, we also found that not only did the average RME abilities of group
members predict collective intelligence in the face-to-face condition (replicating
the finding of Woolley et al. [11]), but they did so equally strongly in the online
condition (Table 1; Fig. 3; r5.53, p5.002 for face-to-face groups; r5.55, p,.001
for online groups). In other words, the scores of group members on the RME
measure were a strong predictor of how well the groups could perform a wide
range of tasks together, even when participants were only collaborating online via
text chat and could not see each other’s eyes or facial expressions at all. This
suggests that scores on the RME test must be correlated with a broader set of ToM
abilities and that these broader abilities are critical to group performance even
when the subtle nonverbal cues available face-to-face (and operationalized in the
RME test) are not available.
These abilities also appear to be separate from traditional personality factors.
We found no significant correlation between a general factor of personality [43]
and collective intelligence or RME (p..05 in both face-to-face and online
conditions; see Table S4 in S1 Text).
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In addition, we found that online groups were similar to face-to-face groups in
other ways. First, we found that the proportion of women in the online groups
was a strong predictor of collective intelligence (Table 1; r5.41, p5.01) and that
the average RME ability in a group mediated the effects of the proportion of
Fig. 2. Scree plot comparing the variance explained by the first five factors extracted from a factor analysis of group performance on each of the
groups tasks in this study, as compared to the factor structures reported in Woolley et al.’s [11] study. The first factor (collective intelligence) explains
over 40% of the variance in all cases, while the second factor accounts for less than half of this amount, and the remaining factors account for much less.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115212.g002
Table 1. Correlations between collective intelligence of a group and other group characteristics.
Collective
Intelligence RME Test %Female
Amount of
Comm
Online Groups RME Test .55**
% Female .41* .36*
Amount of Comm1 .47** .33* .10
Distribution of
Comm2
–.41* –.45** –.32* –.25
Face-to-Face Groups RME Test .53**
% Female .20 .16
Amount of Comm1 .52** .51** –.06
Distribution of Comm2 –.30* –.25 .04 .01
*5p,.0.05.
**5p,0.01.
1Amount of communication refers to chat communication in online groups and verbal communication in face-to-face groups.
2Distribution of communication refers to the standard deviation of communication among members in a group.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115212.t001
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women in the group on collective intelligence (Sobel z51.95, p5.05), the same
pattern we found in our previous study [11].
Next, we found that, in both face-to-face and online groups, the total amount
of communication was positively correlated with collective intelligence, and the
standard deviations of communication and work contribution were negatively
correlated with collective intelligence (Table 1). In other words, groups that
communicated more were more collectively intelligent, but groups in which one
or two people dominated the discussion and activity were less collectively
intelligent, whether the groups were online or face-to-face.
Finally, when we regressed collective intelligence onto the RME measure and
the amount and distribution of communication within the group, we found these
two factors have similar levels of influence on group performance in both the
online and face-to-face conditions (see Table 2, models 1 and 4). This suggests
that the theory of mind abilities associated with RME scores are facilitating group
collaboration in ways beyond what is solely captured by the amount of verbal
communication.
Fig. 3. Relationship between average group RME and collective intelligence scores for face to-face (N532) and online (N536) groups. The
correlations are significant and almost identical for both groups. Similar results are obtained when the two potential outlier groups with the lowest average
RME scores are removed (r5.47, p,0.01 and r5.48, p,0.01 for face-to-face and online groups, respectively).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115212.g003
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Discussion
Taken together, these results provide strong empirical support for the emergence
of collective intelligence in online groups, and the conclusion that theory of mind
abilities are a significant determinant of group collective intelligence even when, as
in many online groups, the group has extremely limited communication channels.
This study underscores the importance of continuing to develop our
understanding of the factors contributing to collective intelligence in groups. Only
recently have we come to understand collective intelligence as a unique quality of
groups, indicative of their ability to perform a variety of different tasks [11].
Traditionally, a team’s potential has been conceptualized as the ‘‘resources’’ that
are available to the group in the form of the information, intelligence, or other
abilities of individual team members [44, 45] typically measured as the aggregate
of individual members’ g or general intelligence [46–48] or the special expertise or
task-specific cognitive abilities of team members [47, 49, 50].
The relationship between team cognitive ability and performance has been
shown to vary with the way that cognitive ability is represented in the team and
the type of task the team is performing. In particular, the performance of teams
working on a task that requires a high degree of cooperation and communication
is most influenced by the member with the lowest cognitive ability, because that
person tends to slow the rest of the group [51]. In contrast, on tasks for which the
optimal strategy is to select the best member (e.g., running a race, or answering a
factual question), the cognitive ability of the highest scoring member predicts
performance [44, 52]. Finally, more complex, multi-faceted tasks that require each
member of the team to perform a subtask and then combine inputs into a team
product are most influenced by the average ability of team members, because
higher average cognitive ability is associated with greater propensity to adapt to a
changing environment, as well as to learn from new information discovered in the
course of work (e.g., [46, 53]).
Table 2. Results of OLS Regressions of collective intelligence on the average Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RME) score, the amount of communication,
and the distribution of communication.
Condition 1: Face-to-Face Condition 2: Online
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Reading Mind in the Eyes 0.52** 0.34‘ 0.26 0.55** 0.45** 0.38*
Amount of Comm 0.34‘ 0.39‘ 0.32* 0.30*
Distribution of Comm 20.24 20.17
F 8.44** 6.08** 4.81* 15.02** 10.91** 7.74*
R2 0.27** 0.36** 0.41** 0.31** 0.40* 0.42*
change R2 0.088‘ 0.051 0.09** 0.02
‘p,.10, two-tailed.
*p,.05, two-tailed.
**p,.001, two-tailed.
Amount and distribution of communication represent recorded verbal communication for face-to-face groups and text chat for online groups.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115212.t002
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However, it is also telling that the correlation of team average cognitive ability
and performance drops to r5.14 in field settings, which is probably due to the fact
that teams need to execute a range of functions that go beyond those that are
predicted by aggregate cognitive ability [45, 47]. One probable explanation for the
lack of explanatory power is the attempt to conceptualize team ability by
aggregating individual-level measurements, which loses information in general-
izing across levels of analysis [54]. This suggests that an index of a group’s ability,
such as the collective intelligence metric developed and tested here, utilizing
uniquely group level information, should provide a better mechanism for
predicting which groups will perform well in the future.
These results also demonstrate that teams comprised of members with a
broader range of ability for perceiving subtle interpersonal cues will be better-
equipped to develop higher levels of collective intelligence, especially in less rich,
online chat-based environments. Here we used the RME test to measure theory of
mind, but theory of mind ability can, in principle, be measured in many ways. The
RME test is not the only measure of the construct; other tests include the Strange
Stories test [55], the Faux Pas Recognition test [56], the Reading the Mind in the
Voice test [57], and the Social Reasoning Wason Selection Test [58]. But the RME
test is among the most widely accepted [59] and most well-validated in adult
populations, having been shown to have adequate test-retest reliability [60] and to
consistently differentiate control subjects from autism-spectrum individuals, who
are below-average in social perceptiveness [22].
The RME test is also sensitive to differences between men and women and to
differences among people who choose different educational fields [22]. The RME
test has been shown to be sensitive in children to levels of prenatal testosterone
[61] and in adults to administration of oxytocin [62]. All this suggests that the
RME test is measuring a robust property of individual brain function; if
performance on the test were completely determined by contextual factors then
we would not expect to see such correlations or experimental effects. Crucially,
unlike the other established ToM measures, which are designed for assessing
children’s development, brain damage, or autism-spectrum conditions, the RME
test has substantial variance in the general adult population, and it taps into both
verbal and nonverbal aspects of interpretation in social situations.
The degree to which ToM, as measured by RME or otherwise, can be altered by
training or experience remains an open question. Recent studies [63] suggest that
theory of mind abilities as measured by RME can be, at least temporarily,
improved by reading literary fiction, which implies a new and interesting avenue
of research for improving group performance.
In summary, our results provide strong empirical support for the conclusion
that even the collaboration of teams working online can be characterized by a
single collective intelligence factor, and that theory of mind abilities are just as
important to group effectiveness in these online environments where many kinds
of non-verbal communication are not possible. In other words, it appears that the
Reading the Mind in the Eyes test does not just measure the ability to read
Theory of Mind Predicts Collective Intelligence
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emotions in eyes but also the ability to ‘‘read between the lines’’ of text-based
online interactions.
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scores, RME, and interaction metrics for face-to-face groups. Table S4b,
Correlations between collective intelligence (CI), task scores, RME, and
interaction metrics for online groups.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115212.s002 (DOCX)
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